INTRODUCTION
The United States Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO 2013) breaks down the five components of internal control: control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring activities into 17 principles to achieve internal audit objectives at the firm level. Among the five internal control components, principle 4 of the control environment indicates, "The organization demonstrates a commitment to attract, develop, and retain competent individuals in alignment with internal control objectives". This is accomplished by allocating a sufficient number of internal auditors with competency to support the firm's internal control system. This study elucidates the link between human resources in internal audit and external audit pricing decision by examining external audit fees, external audit hours, and an external unit audit price.
Firms are motivated to find an acceptable level of information risk between firms and stakeholders by identifying the optimal internal control. The presence of information risk drives firms to hire external auditors, and external auditors involve internal auditors to attain a holistic understanding of firms' control environment. Thus, an examination of cross-sectional differences in external audit fees, external audit hours, and the external unit audit price would reveal direct evidence as to what type of human resources in the internal audit have affected external audit pricing decision.
Regulators, firms and auditors may find the effects of human resources in the internal audit on external audit pricing decision-useful based on three reasons. First, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has responded to the Securities Exchange Commission's (SEC) concerns over deteriorated internal audit quality by securitizing inspections over the issuance of adverse internal control opinions (Defond & Lennox, 2017) . The increases in the issuance of PCAOB inspection reports drive external auditors to be more rigorous about their internal control audits, which in turn, increase external audit fees. In the midst of continuous costs and benefits analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 404b by the PCAOB in association with disclosure of internal control effectiveness, regulators may find the results of this study useful whether the collaboration between in-house internal auditors and external auditors may provide an opportunity to improve audit quality in a cost-effective manner without deteriorating external auditors' independence. Next, as the demand of data analytics in the internal audit function increases, it is critical to recognize how to overcome "inadequate staffing or skills for big data analytics" by having a retrospective view to examine what type of traditional human resources in the internal audit has affected external auditors' professional judgement. The optimal mixture of human resources with financial literacy and technical skills in the internal audit will meet the future market demand (Russom, 2011; Deloitte, 2016) . Lastly, SOX 404 (b) exemption culminated auditor oversight of the effectiveness of firms' internal control over financial reporting for firms with public floats of less than $75 million has produced audit savings for clients (Ge et al., 2017) . This reduced litigation and legal costs for using auditor-provided internal control effectiveness disclosures, which ultimately decreases the auditoragainst litigations. On the other hand, it may lead to even higher litigation risk if ineffective internal controls are uncovered, especially for smaller firms (Doyle et al., 2007) . Thus, to the extent of litigation risk due to ineffective internal controls, an examination of human resources in the internal audit on external audit pricing decision may provide useful information to external auditors.
Archival research into human resources in internal audit focuses on the effects of internal audit function as a whole on external audit fees (Felix et al., 2001 ), external auditors' decision to rely on the internal audit function (Glover et al., 2008; Prawitt et al., 2011; Messier et al., 2011) , the effect of human resource investment on disclosure of weaknesses in internal controls (Choi et al., 2013) , or the impact of statutory internal auditor characteristics and operating efficiency (Cho et al., 2015) . No prior studies, to the best of the author's knowledge, examine the association of human resources in internal audit and external audit pricing decision. While most prior research depends on external audit fees as the only measure to signal either improved audit quality or a threat of auditor independence from external auditors' attributes (Krishnan et al., 2005; Higgs & Skantz, 2006; Ghosh et al., 2009 ), this study dissects external audit fees into external audit hours (a measure of auditor effort), and external unit audit price (a measure of auditor competency) as a combination of internal systems costs and external audit. Subsequently, this study suggests how the sufficiency (the proportion of internal auditors in specialized fields) and competency (professional and industry experience at the management level or at the staff level) of internal auditors impacts external audit pricing decision.
This study uses the US firms within the Global Audit Information Network (GAIN hereafter) database provided by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA, hereafter) as the primary dataset. The GAIN database covers various types of institutions such as publicly traded firms, private firms, and educational and governmental institutions and collects data on their internal audit practices. Since the IIA does not identify the responding organizations, the samples are matched with total assets, total revenues, and operating industry according to Fama and French (1997) industry classifications, and are identified with necessary audit, financial, and corporate governance variables. Through this process, a total 175 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2008 to 2012 are obtained.
The results present evidence that external audit fees are negatively and significantly associated with the proportion of general internal auditors. Further, external audit hours are negatively and significantly associated with the proportion of general auditors without affecting external unit audit price. In addition, the results of the data adjusted for firm size suggest that audit fees and audit hours decrease for smaller firms as the proportion of general internal auditor increases. This implies that both small firms and their external auditors are encouraged to utilize more general internal auditors in performing an external audit. The author finds no evidence that external audit fees are associated with internal auditor expertise or experience. In essence, external auditors are not likely to rely on internal auditors' professional judgment in performing an external audit due to reduced auditor independence.
This study provides the first empirical evidence concerning the effects of human resources in the internal audit on external audit fees, external audit hours, and the external unit audit price by using unique audit hour data collected by the IIA, which is not publicly available in the US. This study explores whether external audit fees increase when external audit hours or the external unit audit price increase, or both (Simunic, 1980; O'Keefe et al., 1994; Bae et al., 2016) in the light of human resources in internal audit based on principle 4 of the control environment according to COSO (2013) internal audit objectives.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant literature and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 offers conclusions and implications.
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Human resources in internal audit
Following the spirit of a resource-based view, organizations may sustain competitive advantage based on core components such as physical capital, human resources, organizational resources, and financial capital (Barney, 1991 (Barney, , 2001 ). One of the major components in the internal control system is human resources. For example, COSO (2013) states that organizations shall commit to attract, develop, and retain competent internal auditors as one control environment principles. This indicates that allocation of a sufficient number of internal auditors with competency (e.g., expertise, experience) to support the firm's internal control system is necessary in order to achieve the anticipated firm outcome (Huselid, 1995; Pennings et al., 1998) . Verreault and Hyland (2005) also support that it is essential to incorporate human resource management in internal audit with a focus on risk management paradigm to create value-added internal audit function within organizations.
After a series of accounting irregularities, several studies examine the association between human resources in internal audit (Ge & McVay, 2005; Choi et al., 2013) or human resources in external audit (Cheng et al., 2009; Kang et al., 2017) and external audit quality. Ge and McVay (2005) report that insufficient number of internal auditors with inadequate technical expertise is the most common reason for internal control weaknesses in the U.S., and Choi et al. (2013) pinpoint that adequate human resource management is negatively associated with the disclosure of internal control weaknesses, and positively association with the remediation of the internal control weaknesses. Cheng et al. (2009) examine the association between human resources in external audit and external audit quality using Taiwanese audit firms. They find that external auditor education expenditure, external auditor tenure, and the number of CPAs at the audit firm level have positive effects on external audit quality, measured by the natural log of audit firms' revenues. Kang et al. (2017) provide additional evidence that higher compensation to external auditors in Korean audit firms increases audit quality, measured by the level of conservatism of audit clients' financial statements.
While these studies consistently support that better human resources in internal audit or external audit significantly improve external audit quality, this study bridges a gap between human resources in internal audit and external audit by investigating whether the collaboration of human resources in internal audit in external audit affects external auditor's pricing decision.
External audit pricing decision
Prior studies present mixed evidence on the association between external audit pricing decision and internal audit (Wallace 1984 Hackenbrack and Knechel (1997) find that external audit fees are significantly associated with variations in the number of external audit hours put in by external audit firms rather than internal auditors due to client characteristics rather than internal audit. In a similar vein, Mock and Wright (1999) find a non-significant association between the level of and changes in client risk (e.g., management aggressiveness, misstatement) and external audit plans.
In contrast, Wallace (1984) finds that use of the internal audit function reduces growing external audit fees by improving a firm's accounting controls, as internal auditors perform financial examinations on external auditors. Further, Anderson and Zeghal (1994) find that firms with the internal audit function utilize 44 percent of total audit costs on external audit fees. This indicates that the internal audit function is significantly correlated with the external audit function. Among the studies in the 2000s, Glover et al. (2008) report that external auditors are likely to utilize the internal audit function as long as the inherent risk is low, and external auditors rely more on work performed by internal auditors for objective tasks than subjective tasks when inherent risk is high. Messier et al. (2011) also find that external auditors charge higher external audit fees to firms that use the internal audit function as a management training ground, which tends to make the internal audit less objective.
While prior studies discussed above coherently show that external auditors' decision to rely upon on internal audit function is associated with external audit fees, none of previous studies examine how quantitative (the number of internal auditors) and qualitative (expertise, experience) human resources at individual level impacts external audit pricing decision measured with external audit fees, external audit hours, and external unit audit price or, possibly, both.
Hypothesis development
As an external audit is a subsystem of a firm's financial reporting system, which consists of internal systems costs and audit services provided by external auditors (Simunic 1980) , it is critical to find out how firms and their external auditors utilize the mix of internal audit of human resources to meet the demand of external auditing. One of five principles may be at work; the control environment may support internal control systems as part of the organizational structure itself if there is a sufficient number of competent internal auditors with expertise and experience.
External audit fees are significantly associated with variations in the number of external audit hours put in by external audit firms rather than internal auditors due to client characteristics rather than internal audit (O'Keefe et al., 1994; Mock & Wright, 1999) . On the other hand, internal audit impacts external audit pricing decision based on audit risk in client's internal control environment (Glover et al., 2011) , and the inherent limitation of internal auditor's independence in performing external audit (Messier et al., 2011) .
Thus, it is an empirical question whether the sufficiency and competency of internal auditors in specific fields, professional and industry experience at the management level or at the staff level are associated with external audit fees. Therefore, the first hypothesis is in the null form:
H1: External audit fees are not significantly associated with the human resources in internal audit. Simunic (1980) , Simunic and Stein (1996) suggest an external audit fee model, which is a function of the expected audit risk and audit effort. While audit risk is the present value of possible future losses due to external audit failure (e.g. an issuance of an unqualified opinion without detecting financial misstatements), audit effort is the cost incurred by human resources participated in the external audit project. Audit effort consists of two components: external audit hours and external unit audit price. The external audit hours and external unit audit price change as the level of audit risk changes. For example, external auditors may ask for audit premiums to cover higher expected future losses due to audit failures when audit risk is high. On the other hand, external auditors may offer audit discounts based on the efficient audit engagement when audit risk is low. In either case, external audit hours and external unit audit price affect external audit fees.
Among few studies that discuss about audit hours and unit audit price (Simunic, 1980; Palmrose, 1986; Bae et al., 2016) , Simunic (1980) reports that external audit fees demonstrate audit efforts based on greater external audit hours or unit audit price charged by external auditors who are industry specialists as a means of audit premiums. Palmrose (1986) also finds that greater external audit hours exerted by Big N auditors result in better audit quality to clients in evidence acquisition, but there is no significant association between external auditors who are industry specialists and either external audit fees or external audit hours. Based on the seminal work of Simunic (1980) and Palmrose (1986) , recently, Bae et al. (2016) show that audit premiums are driven by a greater quantity of lowcost junior level external auditors for high external audit hours rather than external auditors' industry specialization.
If external auditor's audit premiums are driven by a greater number of low-cost junior level external auditors, conversely, audit discounts may be attained by utilizing a greater number of internal auditors with deep industry or firm-specific knowledge, without sacrificing audio quality. On the other hand, audit quality may be deteriorated by relying upon internal auditors who may be a threat of auditor independence from external auditors' perspective. Thus, using internal auditors may generate greater audit premiums to protect external auditors from potential auditor against litigations. Thus, it is unclear whether external audit hours and unit audit prices are associated with the sufficiency and competency of internal auditors, which depends on external auditors' professional judgment.
Thus, an examination of cross-sectional differences in external audit fees, external audit hours, and the external unit audit price would reveal direct evidence as to what drives audit fee premiums or discounts when the sufficiency and competency of internal auditors are considered. This leads to the next two hypotheses in the null form:
H2 
RESEARCH DESIGN
Research model
The author estimates the OLS regression as shown in equation (1) to determine the effects of human resources in internal audit on external audit fees. Subsequently, the author estimates the OLS regression following equation (2) to test the effects of human resources in internal audit on external audit hours as well as external unit audit price, which are external audit fees per hour: 
Where: AF: The natural log of external audit fees; AH: The natural log of external audit hours which combine both internal auditors and external auditors to complete the external audit project;
AP: The natural log of external audit fees divided by external audit hours, which combine both internal auditors and external auditors;
IATH: The natural log of internal audit hours to provide direct assistance to support external audit requested by external auditors;
IATP: The natural log of external audit fees divided by internal audit hours to provide direct assistance to support external audit requested by external auditors;
BU: Ratio of the number of general auditors to the total number of employees of a firm;
IT: Ratio of IT expertise internal auditors to the total number of employees of a firm;
FRA: Ratio of the number of fraud expertise internal auditors to the total number of employees of a firm;
ENV: Ratio of environmental expertise internal auditors to the total number of employees of a firm;
CMGR:
Total number of professional certifications (CPA, CIA, CISA, CMA etc.) possessed by chief audit executives, directors, and managers level;
PMGR: 1 if the professional experience of chief audit executives, directors, and managers level are above the median of the entire sample, and 0 otherwise; IMGR: 1 if industry experience of chief audit executives, directors, and managers level are above the median of the entire sample, and 0 otherwise; CSTF: The author includes a predictive validity framework (Libby box) of the research model in Figure 1 . At the conceptual level, this study examines the effects of human resources in the internal audit on external audit pricing decision. At the operational levels, human resources in internal audit are measured by the number of internal auditors, internal auditor expertise, and internal auditor experience. Afterwards, external audit pricing decision is measured by external audit fees, external audit hours, and an external unit audit price. Lastly, the author controls other potentially influential variables (financial characteristics, auditor characteristics, corporate governance characteristics, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects). 
External audit fees, external audit hours, and external unit audit price
The first dependent variable, external audit fees, or AF, is the natural logarithm of external audit fees following Messier et al. (2011) ; the second, AH is the natural logarithm of external audit hours; the last dependent variable, AP, is the natural logarithm of external audit fees divided by the number of external audit hours according to Bae et al. (2016) . The independent variable, human resources in internal audit with sufficiency is measured by the number of internal auditors with specific audit specialist. BU is the ratio of the number of general internal auditors to the total number of employees; IT is the ratio of information technology (IT, hereafter) expertise internal auditors to the total number of employees; FRA is the ratio of fraud expertise internal auditors to the total number of employees; and ENV is the ratio of environmental expertise to the total number of employees. 
Human resources in internal audit
Control variables
Control variables similar to those utilized in prior studies are selected (Cahan et 2011), the author includes SIZE because larger firms demand greater audit effort, which results in higher external audit fees and external audit hours; IR is a measure of inherent risk; COMX causes auditors to charge higher fees and require additional coordination when operations are more complex; LEV is included because external auditors charge higher fees when firms are highly leveraged; ROA and LOS are included because external audit fees and external audit hours are higher for poorly performing firms; NAF is included in equation (1) because prior studies find mixed evidence in relation to the impact of non-audit fees on external audit fees (Palmrose, 1986; Whisenant et al., 2003) ; In a similar vein, IAFH is included in equation (2) since the nature of internal audit hours to provide direct assistance to support financial external audit is mainly for low-level objective tasks, which needs to be controlled to examine the association between the sufficiency and competency of internal auditors and external audit fees (Simunic, 1980; Palmrose, 1986; Bae et al., 2016) .
BIGN and SPEC are included since Big N audit firms generally charge higher fees, and industry specialists demand higher external audit fees and more external audit hours (Bae et al., 2016); following Messier et al. (2011) , firms with nonDecember 31 year-ends generally receive fee discounts (YE), as well as the current ratio (CUR), are controlled because liquidity may be negatively associated with external audit fees; the author also includes firms involved in acquisition activities (ACQ) and whether there are any foreign sales or not (FSALE) since external auditors exert greater audit efforts when firms have complex operations; the author also includes material weaknesses in internal control (IMW) and restatements (RES) during the year because such disclosures increase overall audit risk for external auditors, which result in higher external audit fees to protect external auditors from potential legal action; the difference in days between a company's fiscal year-end and the date the audit report was issue (ALAG) is included to control potential issues in the audit, which require greater audit efforts; the number of years the external auditor has provided the company's external audit (ATEN) are added to control the length of the auditor-client independent relationship.
In addition, corporate governance quality variables are included in both equations following the protocol in prior studies (Carcello et 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Sample selection
The GAIN database covers a wide range of institutions such as publicly-traded firms, private firms, educational and governmental institutions, and their internal audit practices. The sample consists of firms whose information is available from the GAIN (Global Audit Information Network) Benchmarking System (The Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc., Lake Mary, Florida, USA) from the 2007-2016 Questionnaires(s) 3 . The IIA surveys provide various information related to internal audit practices including organizational information, resources, oversight functions in relation to chief audit executives and audit committees, audit planning activities, audit implementation, and performance management. The content of the survey varied slightly prior to 2008, but none of the questions and answers in relation to variables included in this study was changed during the sample period from 2008 to 2012. Panel A of Table 2 presents a sample selection summary.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the yearly distribution of total firm-year observations. The frequency of total observations ranges from 32 to 39 per fiscal year, which is evenly distributed from 2008 to 2012. In addition, panel C of Table 2 (pipelines, except natural gas), 48 (communications), 49 (electric, gas, and sanitary services), 60 (depository institutions), 61 (non-depository credit institutions), 62 (security and commodity brokers, dealers), 63 (insurance carriers), 64 (insurance agents, brokers, and services), and 67 (holding and other investment offices). 2 For high litigation-risk industries, the author also classifies firms using the following two-digit SIC codes following Hogan and Jeter (1999) and Cahan, Godfrey, Hamilton and Jeter (2008): 28 (chemicals and allied products), 35 (industrial and commercial machinery, and computer equipment), 36 (electronic and other electrical equipment and components, except computer equipment), 38 (measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments), 60 (depository institutions), 67 (holding and other investment offices), and 73 (business services). 3 Visit http://na.theiia.org/GAIN for more information. Fees (in USD '000); AFit:
The natural log of external audit fees;
AHit:
The natural log of external audit hours which combine both internal auditors and external auditors to complete the external audit project;
APit:
The natural log of external audit fees divided by external audit hours which combine both internal auditors and external auditors; Independent Variables: BUit:
Ratio of the number of general auditors to the total number of employees of a firm; ITit:
Ratio of IT expertise internal auditors to the total number of employees of a firm; FRAit:
Ratio of the number of fraud expertise internal auditors to the total number of employees of a firm; ENVit:
Ratio of environmental expertise internal auditors to the total number of employees of a firm; The natural logarithm of total assets (in USD '000) ; IRit:
CMGRit
Sum of inventory and receivables divided by total assets; COMXit:
The number of business segments that the company has; LEVit:
Total liabilities divided by total assets; ROAit:
Net income divided by total assets; LOSit:
An indicator if net income before extraordinary items is less than zero; NAFit:
Non-audit fees paid by a company to its external auditor scaled by the external audit fee; IAFHit:
internal audit hours to provide direct assistance to support an external financial audit; BIGNit:
Indicators if a firm is one of Deloitte, PwC, KPMG, or EY; SPECit:
A dichotomous variable that indicates whether the external auditor is an industry specialist auditor at the national level; YEit:
A dichotomous variable indicating whether the company's fiscal year-end is December (yes = 1, no = 0).
CURit:
Current assets divided by current liabilities;
ACQit:
A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if a company has any nonzero amount listed acquisition-related accounts in their statement of cash flows, and 0 otherwise;
FSALEit:
A dichotomous variable indicating whether a company has any foreign sales listed in the Compustat segments file (yes = 1, no =0);
IMWit:
A dichotomous variable indicating whether a firm experienced an internal control weakness; RESit:
1 if firm announced a restatement during the year, 0 otherwise; ALAGit:
The difference between a company's fiscal year-end and the date the audit report was issued; ATENit:
The number of years the external auditor has provided the company's external audit;
INDEPit:
Percentage of the Board of Directors that are considered to be independent; CCHit:
1 if the CEO is also the chairperson of the company, not of the Board of Directors, and 0 otherwise; REGit:
1 if the industry is regulated, and 0 otherwise; LITit:
1 if the industry is a high litigation-risk industry, and 0 otherwise. Control variables show that internal audit resources are valued across the board regardless of the size of companies, and the sample firms are in the relatively complex operational environment. This implies that a greater need of internal audit function, utilization of Big N external auditors, and a focus on internal corporate governance are critical, especially among highly litigious or regulated industries (e.g. utilities, banking, and insurance industries). Table 4 provides the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables in model equations (1) and (2) . Panel A of Table 4 shows how AF, AH, AP are correlated with the internal control variables. Both AF and AH are negatively and significantly associated with BU and IT at the 1 percent level. This indicates that the ratio of the number of general auditors to the total number of employees, as well as the ratio of IT expertise internal auditors to the total number of employees, are negatively associated with external audit fees and external audit hours. In contrast, AF is positively and significantly associated with CMGR, CSTF, and IMGR at the 1 percent level. In a similar vein, AH is positively and significantly associated with CMGR and IMGR at the 1 percent level. AH is positively and significantly associated with PSTF at the 5 percent level, and with ISTF at the 10 percent level. This implies that a total number of professional certifications at the management level and at the staff level are positively associated with external audit fees, and both professional and industry experience at the management and at the staff level are positively associated with external audit hours.
Panel B of Table 4 shows how the correlation between AF, AH, and AP are correlated with control variables. AF is positively and significantly associated with SIZE, COMX, BIGN, and FSALE at the 1 percent level, also positively and significantly associated with LEV, ACQ, and IMW at the 5 percent level, and lastly, positively and significantly associated with CUR at the 10 percent level. The positive and significant associations between AF and the firm risk characteristics variables described above indicate that firms with more complex operations are associated with higher external audit fees to reduce information asymmetry between firms and stakeholders, which is consistent with Messier et al. (2011) . Further, AH is positively and significantly associated with SIZE, LEV, and BIGN at the 1 percent level, positively and significantly associated with COMX, ACQ, and FSALE at the 5 percent level, and positively and significantly associated with CUR and CCH at the 10 percent level. The results indicate that companies with bigger and complex operations are more likely higher Big N auditors, and more likely to allow the CEO and chairman duality. Finally, AP is positively and significantly associated with LOS and FSALE at the 5 percent level and 10 percent level respectively. This shows that firms pay higher external unit audit price to external auditors in the presences of greater financial issues or more operational complexity. An evaluation of the variance inflation factors associated with this regression analysis suggests that multicollinearity is not a concern 4 . Table 5 presents the results of the empirical analyses using equations (1) . In column (1), the coefficient on BU (0.462) is negative and significant at the 1 percent level when the dependent variable is AF. Thus, external audit fees are negatively and significantly associated with the proportion of general internal auditors. In column (2), the coefficient on BU (0.971) is positive and significant at the 10 percent level when the dependent variable is AF for companies with total assets equal to or greater than the median value for the entire sample (when size is measured with the natural logarithm of the number of total employees, the result remains qualitatively the same). On the other hand, in column (3), the coefficient on BU 4 The Pearson correlation matrix reveals no large correlations between the independent variables in the regression analysis, with the exception of BU and IT (p-value <.001), for which a high correlation of 0.430 is found. The maximum variance inflation factor is 4.252 when both the BU and IT variables are included in the regression model. When these variables are excluded and the analysis is conducted again, the direction of the results remain unchanged. Variable  AH  AP  SIZE  IR  COMX  LEV  ROA  LOS  NAFEE IAFH  BIGN  JOINT  YE  CUR  ACQ  FSALE  IMW  RES  ALAG  ATEN INDEP  CCH  REG Table 6 shows the results of the equation (2) by firm size in relation to AH. In column (1), the coefficient on BU (0.660) is negative and significant at the 1 percent in association with AH. Thus, the result indicates that external audit hours decrease as the ratio of the number of general auditors to the total number of employees increases. Further, the coefficients of CSTF (0.028) and ISTF (0.198) are positive and significant at the 1 percent level and 5 percent level respectively. This shows that external audit hours increase as the number of professional certifications attained by internal auditors and industry experience of internal auditors at the staff level increase. In column (2), the coefficient on CSTF (0.028) is positive and significant at 10 percent level in association with AH. The result indicates that internal auditor competency measured with the number of professional certification attained by internal auditors at the staff level is weakly associated with greater audit hours for larger firms. The weak result in larger firms may be attributed to the effect of the economics of scale (Bae et al., 2016) that the internal audit function as a departmental unit has an incremental impact to decrease external audit hours rather than at the internal audit personnel. In column (3), the coefficients of BU (0.01) and FRA (6.464) are negative and significant at the 5 percent in association with AH. The results support that greater proportion of general auditors and fraud internal auditors decrease external audit hours for smaller firms. Table 7 shows the results of the equation (2) by firm size in relation to AP. The model in column (1) is not robust since the F-test of the overall significance is insignificant. In column (2), the coefficient on BU (1.638) and IT (5.455) are positive and significant at the 10 percent level in association with AP. This implies that the greater proportion of general auditors and that of IT auditors increase external unit audit price for larger firms. Further, the coefficient on PMGR (0.255) is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, but the coefficient of CSTF (0.035) is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. This shows that professional competency at the management level increases external audit unit price, and the number of professional certification at the staff level decreases external audit unit price for larger firms. In column (3), none of the coefficients is significantly associated with AP for smaller firms. The result shows that the sufficiency and competency of internal auditors are insignificantly associated with external unit audit price for smaller firms. 4.3.4. Human resources in internal audit and audit fees, internal audit assisted audit hours, and unit audit price Table 8 presents the results of the empirical analysis using internal audit hours provided direct assistance to support eternal auditors and the external unit audit price based on external audit fees divided by the internal audit hours provided direct assistance to support external auditors. The natural log of internal audit hours to provide direct assistance to support external audit (IATH) and the natural log of external audit fees divided by IATH to provide direct assistance to support external auditor (IATP) have been used as dependent variables. The sample size is reduced from 175 to 138 because of the sample limitations that some firms that did not report IATH. In column (1), the coefficient on BU (0.352) is negatively and significantly associated with AF at the 5 percent level. This indicates that utilization of a greater ratio of general internal auditor decreases external audit fees. The coefficient of CMGR (0. 043) is positively but weakly associated with AF at the 10 percent level, which indicates that more competent internal auditors with a greater number of professional certifications at the management level slightly increase external audit fees. In column (2), the coefficient on CSTF (0.077) is positively and significantly associated with IATH at the 1 percent level. The result indicates that the competency of internal auditors at the staff level with more professional certifications exert greater efforts when they assist external auditors. Lastly, column (3) shows that the coefficient on CSTF (0.074) negatively and significantly associated with IATP at the 1 percent level, which shows that more competent internal auditor with the more number of professional certifications at the staff level has lower external unit audit price for providing direct assistance to external auditors.
Main results
Human resources in internal audit and external audit fees
Human resources in internal audit and external audit hours
Human resources in internal audit and external unit audit price
The results imply that external audit fees neither increase nor decrease since greater internal audit hours to provide direct assistance to support external auditors offset the corresponding external unit audit price at the staff level. Based on the results, external auditors are likely utilized internal auditors at the staff level for objective tasks, rather than subjective tasks (Glover et al., 2008) , and external auditors are not likely to rely on internal auditors' professional judgment in performing an external audit, which may be a threat of auditor independence.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This study presents evidence that external audit fees are negatively and significantly associated with the proportion of general internal auditors. Further, external audit hours are negatively and significantly associated with the proportion of general auditors without affecting external unit audit price. The results of the data adjusted for firm size suggest that audit fees and audit hours decrease for smaller firms as the proportion of general internal auditor increases. This implies that both small firms and their external auditors are encouraged to utilize more general internal auditors in performing an external audit. The author finds no evidence that external audit fees are associated with internal auditor expertise or experience. In essence, external auditors are not likely to rely on internal auditors' professional judgment in performing an external audit due to reduced auditor independence. The results remain qualitatively the same when internal audit hours to provide direct assistance to support external auditors are used instead of the total external audit hours. Finally, internal audit hours to provide direct assistance to support external auditors are positively associated with the total number of professional certifications at the staff level. On the other hand, the external unit audit price based on internal audit assisted audit hours is negatively associated with the total number of professional certifications at the staff level. The results consistently support that external auditors utilize competent general internal auditors at the staff level.
This study provides the first empirical evidence concerning the effects of human resources in the internal audit on external audit pricing decision by using unique audit hour data collected by the IIA, which is not publicly available in the US. This study extends prior studies in an internal audit by showing that the sufficiency and competency of internal auditors at the individual level has an aggregate impact on external audit fees. Regulators, firms and auditors may find this study useful that the collaboration between in-house internal auditors and external auditors may provide an opportunity to improve audit quality in a cost-effective manner without deteriorating external auditors' independence. Finally, this study has a relatively small sample size based on survey data compared to other studies which use a large sample of publicly available data. Thus, it is limited to generalize the results of this study to all other firms.
